What consequences for the Russian gas strategy in view of the Ukrainian crisis?

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FEEM GAS TALKS 2014 BRAINSTORMING WORKSHOP, Session 2, 20-21 November 2014, Milano, Italy

Demand for adaptation: not UA per se, but general economic trends incl. UA

- Since 2009 radical changes in architecture of EU internal gas market => 4 group of factors:
 - 2 economic (on demand & supply side)
 - Institutional (Third Energy Package)
 - Political (RF-UA gas transit crises Jan's2006&2009)
- Consequences for all segments/players of gas value chain within "Broader Energy Europe"
- Ukraine is only one (important, but additional) element among other factors of gas market changes:
 - UA story has radicalized & made demand for changes more/most urgent
 - UA energy turned into political issue + time constrains => mythologization of the RF-UA gas story in Western media
 - Virtual picture vs real facts => deviations from balanced picture & neutrality are not helpful for achieving new equilibrium A.Konoplyanik, FEEM Gas Talks, Milano, 20-21.11.2014


Adaptation of Russia's gas export strategy in Europe

- General rule: maximization of marketable Hotelling/resource rent within competitive (NWE) &/or non-competitive (CEE/CIS) markets (resulted from adequate/inadequate CAPEX in EU/CIS infrastructure development)
- From sole oil-indexed LTGEC in undersupplied growing EU gas market - to flexible & adaptable two-segment structure in oversupplied (contractually &/or physically) EU mature market
- Then & now: 2 contractual structures/pricing mechanisms (though quite different):
 - Then (1968-2009): economic vs political
 - EU = LTC + replacement value = economic pricing from the very start
 - COMECON = political cost-plus till end-1990s/2004 => economic pricing afterwards
 - CIS = political till 2006/2009 => economic pricing with concessions afterwards (UA)
 - Now onwards (2009+): contractual vs spot
 - NWE = (i) LTC (volume) + replacement value (oil-indexed pricing) & (ii) spot (volume) + spot (hub-based pricing);
 - CEE & CIS = LTC + replacement value (+ price concessions from Groningen-formulabased oil-indexed price to UA) => no adequate technical background for competition - yet...

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New model for EU: Evolution of gas value chain & pricing mechanism of Russian gas to EU (1)

Past (Pre-2009) – growing EU market



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New model for EU: Evolution of gas value chain & pricing mechanism of Russian gas to EU (2) Future ("NO GO" contractual scheme under any (?) supply-demand scenario) **Hub-indexation Hub-indexation** Wholesale EU End-use EU **buyer / reseller** Gazprom customer (trade & delivery) **Traditional flexibility** for buyer (TOP) Common interests – downgrading price spiral for (RUS) gas Gazprom as price-taker from GAS BUYER's market (with no Future (what competitive niche for oil-indexed participation on it)? => NO GO LTC & spot deliveries & trade to/within EU?) **Oil-indexation (adapted)** Wholesale EU **Role of End-use EU** Hub-indexati buyer / reseller DG **customers** Gazprom COMP? (delivery) (delivery) Hub-indexation ub-indexation **Gazprom** as UGS EU hubs (trade) one of price-(UA?) makers at emerging EU


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market

Direct supplies to EU end-users

Common interests

Contracted volumes of Russian gas supplies to Europe




Source (primary chart): ERI RAS (T.Mitrova), reproduced in & taken from «The Russian Gas Matrix: How Markets Are Driving Change», Ed. by J.Henderson & S.Pirani, Oxford University Press, 2014, Fig.3.1/p.53.

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Russia's gas export strategy: from "Russia & Europe" to "Russia & Europe & Asia"

- From priority of EU gas export market (when domestic supplies underpriced) – to dynamic balancing within three markets (EU export, RF domestic, Asian export) with (to be achived) price parity
- From one export market (Europe) to two export markets (Europe & Asia) balanced/interconnected through RUS domestic market infrastructure:
 - general adaptations of RF export strategy since first RF-UA crisis (2006) (or even since pre-Orange revolution/2004+) => lengthy process, so
 - new concept have materialised in new (Asian) contracts just now
 - "after" [2014] Ukrainian crisis does not mean "in result of" it
- Russia vs Europe & Asia:
 - Then => one export market => USSR/GOSPLAN => «one market = 1 pipe»
 - Now onward => since USSR & COMECON dissolution (transit risks) & RF-UA transit crises => two export markets concept (1 existing + 1 emerging) => "one market = 2 pipes/means of supply (pipeline &/or LNG)"
 - Still open question: Whether both pipes to each EU market will be used:
 - NWE: UA GTS +/vs (Nordstream+OPAL+Gazelle)
 - SE: UA GTS +/vs South Stream (off-shore + onshore)




Ukraine: "transit interruption probability" index (2009–2014)



Calculated by M.Larionova, Russian Gubkin State Oil & Gas University, Chair "International Oil & Gas Business", Master's programme 2013-2015, based on the methodology jointly developed with the author

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Russia & Europe in the past vs Russia & Europe & Asia in the future



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Thank you for your attention!

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The way forward for EU-Russian gas relations

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RF-EU gas relations: corridor of opportunities

- To understand new post-2009 realities in "Broader Energy Europe":
 - new risks & uncertainties within new realities =>
 - whether "no return points" are passed through? =>
 - to search for new opportunities =>
 - only mutual & multilateral compromise possible
- Driving/balancing principle: to diminish risks & uncertainties to [mutually] tolerable level (P.Lowe/GAC RF-EU)

What to be done by EU

- To stop ASAP anti-Russian sanctions:
 - mutually negative for RF & EU,
 - aimed at slowing down EU economic recovery & at getting rid of EU as US competitor in global competition/recovery
- To implement adequate investment rules for existing capacity:
 - stop blocking OPAL (prevents pay-back of CAPEX already made => Art.13 ECT)
- To develop adequate investment rules for new capacity which:
 - will enable development & operation of South Stream (& similar projects) within Third Energy Package rules based on standard project financing principles
 - will depoliticize regulatory procedures
- To invest adequately in UA transition towards "Eurointegration" to escape negative results of earlier underinvesting in CEE transition to EU rules (infrastructure density)
- To stop base its energy policy on perceptions, esp. on wrong perceptions

What to be done by Russia

- To stop treating Third EU Energy Package as deviation from the rules, not by the new rules
 - Sovereign choice of sovereign states (incl. EU) to develop its internal legislation, even if economically imbalanced (inter alia, trade vs investment stimuli)
- To stop treating implementation of Third package rules (EU energy acquis) in UA as pure political anti-Russia action, not as objective result of UA sovereign choice of accession to the Energy Community Treaty

Thank you for your attention!

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